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Abstract. The economy of the European Union has not recovered from the impact of the 
economic and financial crisis. Growth rates remain low and investment activity is weak. 
This questions current economic policies of the Economic and Monetary Union, known as 
austerity. In opposition to fiscal contraction measures, expansive fiscal action policies are 
often called for to initiate economic recovery. But the national interests of austerity‟s main 
proponent, performed in an asymmetric intergovernmental bargaining arena, render most of 
the proposed expansive action plans impossible and hence austerity is expected to prevail. 
The Juncker-Plan constitutes an expansive action plan which respects the restrictive 
budgetary rules. Nevertheless an investment volume of 315 billion Euro should be made 
available, enabled by 21 billion Euro of public money. The budget contribution should lever 
private funds by a multiplier of 15. The crucial factor of 15 rests on experience with 
Synergetic Financial Instruments which have been increasingly executed during the last 
budget period. This work assesses the impact of expansive public investment conducted 
through these Synergetic Financial Instruments and thus gathers information to undertake 
an appraisal of the Juncker-Plan, foremost of its crucial mechanisms and resulting numbers. 
By this, the potential of financial instruments as means of fiscal policy and the validity of 
the Juncker-Plan can be assessed. 
Keywords. Economic and Monetary Union,  austerity,  fiscal policy,  public investment, 
financial instruments, Juncker-Plan, European Fund for Strategic Investment. 
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1. Introduction 
even years after the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis the 
2014 elections of the president of the European Commission (EC) were 
dominated by the repercussions of this turmoil. Electoral campaigns of both 
candidates, Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz, featured an explicit focus on 
growth and employment issues. The European Union‟s (EU) economy still suffers 
from the crisis‟s impact and shows only modest signs of recovery. The 2014-
world economic outlook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exhibits this 
(IMF, 2014). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2013 was nearly zero and 
stagnated in the second quarter of 2014 along with projections of slightly above 
one per cent of overall EU-28 GDP growth in 2014. Output is not on track with 
pre-crisis levels and the economic lull is illustrated by persistently low inflation 
rates, too. Inflation of 0.5 per cent is far below the official price stability target 
rate of the European Central Bank (ECB) (two per cent) and may indicate the 
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danger of deflation. Overall, instead of indicating a recovery from the crisis, the 
economic projections for the EU are rather sobering. Recovery continues to be the 
core challenge of European policy, which was reflected by the electoral campaigns 
of both EC presidency candidates. This also sheds light on the question if previous 
economic policy action, based on the idea of fiscal contraction, contributed to 
recovery or if alternative ways, proposed mostly in form of expansive action, are 
more appropriate for recovery. 
In the aftermath of the election, the Commission‟s new president, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, launched an initiative called “An Investment Plan for Europe”. The 
Juncker-Plan promises to deploy substantial funds available for strategic 
investment. This expansive action policy is based on comparably few EU-budget 
resources which should lever a multiple of the initial funds. This mechanism rests 
on experience with financial instruments which use synergies between EU-budget 
programmes, multilateral lending institutions like the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and private investors. This work assesses the impact of expansive public 
investment conducted through these Synergetic Financial Instruments (SFIs) and 
thus gathers information to undertake an appraisal of the Juncker-Plan. 
The following methodology will be conducted. Section two illustrates the need 
for expansive fiscal action by reviewing the outcomes of recent EU economic 
policies, looking at the state of (public)  investment in Europe and introducing the 
Juncker-Plan in detail. Section three examines if the EU investment architecture is 
an appropriate vehicle to conduct strategic investment. As a part of EU-level 
investment tools, SFIs will be analysed in section four. Section five draws 
inferences from this progressive way of fiscal policy about the reasonability of the 
Juncker-Plan and provides a critical assessment. This will be amended by 
alternative proposals to the critical aspects of the Juncker-Plan. 
 
2. Recent EU Economic Policies 
For a sound understanding of the topic, it‟s useful to clarify why an expansive 
action plan is needed. Recent changes in economic policy coordination within the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) obviously failed to overcome the impact of 
the crisis. The European economic regime is shaped according to a mainstream 
economic belief, often called the New Consensus on Macroeconomics (NCM). 
Highly stylised, the cornerstones are an independent central bank focussing on 
price stability, a marginalised stance on fiscal policy which should primarily 
guarantee budgetary stability and the perception of a supply-side determination of 
economic activity, namely output and employment (Arestis & Sawyer, 2004; 
Sadeh & Verdun, 2009; Hein, et al., 2011; Scharpf, 2011). The EMU‟s design is 
sometimes also called the „Brussel- Frankfurt Consensus‟ (Jones, 2013). This 
indicates the transfer of the German Bundesbank‟s historically rooted conduct of 
monetary policy, influenced by the economic concept of Ordoliberalism, to the 
European level. Core components are price stability, sound public budgets, supply-
sided reforms shaping free, efficient markets and, with respect to European 
integration, national responsibility for fiscal issues (Featherstone, 2012; Bibow, 
2013b; Boyer, 2013; Jones, 2013). Accordingly, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
is independent and its mandate is to guarantee stable prices. The European fiscal 
capacity is comparably weak and national budgets are subject to the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP is concerned with coordination and mutual 
surveillance of fiscal policy and imposes (one-size-fits-all) thresholds to national 
public debt. 
In the wake of the economic and financial crisis national public debt levels 
accelerated because governments took over private debt to dampen damage to the 
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real economy. In turn, government bond spreads rose in periphery countries due to 
a loss of confidence and panic inside financial markets, rendering the refinancing 
of governments impossible (De Grauwe & Ji, 2012, 2013a). The widespread 
interpretation of the crisis cited public profligacy as the main cause of the 
governments‟ inability to refinance their budgets, which is perceived as a 
fundamental mistake (Hein, 2012; Bellofiore, 2013; De Grauwe, 2013a).
 European 
decision-makers launched a series of rescue actions and reforms of the EMU 
framework to defend the common currency. On the one hand, liquidity was 
provided to countries under pressure by the build-up of country-specific, or EU-
wide, bail-outs funds and the ECB‟s credible intervention in the government bond 
market as a quasi-lender of last resort. This eased government bond spreads‟ climax 
(De Grauwe, 2013b; Saka, et al., 2014). On the other hand, a series of reforms to 
the framework of fiscal coordination was launched. A revised SGP and the new 
Fiscal Compact comprised tightened budget rules, enforcement of sanctions, 
increased surveillance of fiscal policy and the introduction of technical indicators 
controlling for macroeconomic imbalances (Buti & Carnot, 2012). Overall these 
operations urge national governments to pursue fiscal contraction and supply-sided 
reforms to meet the objectives of the reformed EMU rules (Schilirò, 2013). 
Countries claiming bailout fund-benefits were subject to specific austerity 
programmes. Fiscal austerity for restoring budgetary stability is well suited to the 
NCM‟s attitude with the respect to government expenditure‟s effects on economic 
activity, like Briotti (2005) shows. As fiscal policy‟s impact on growth is perceived 
to be small, fiscal contraction should also have no big negative effects. Based on 
the assumption of Ricardian equivalence, budgetary stability supports restoring 
the confidence of financial markets. Together with supply-sided reforms, this 
strategy should help to reduce government bonds spreads and well- working 
markets should induce growth. 
2.1. The Impact of Austerity 
Recent economic developments in the Eurozone seem to contradict these 
assumptions. Austerity rather amplified recessionary developments. De Grauwe & 
Ji state: “The more intense the austerity, the larger the subsequent increase in debt-
to-GDP ratios. (…) Thus, it can be concluded that the sharp austerity measures that 
were imposed by market and policy-makers‟ panic not only produced deep 
recessions in the countries that were exposed to the medicine, but also that up to 
now this medicine did not work.” (2013a, p.37). Rising debt-to-GDP ratios 
revealed the difficulty of deleveraging in the absence of economic growth (Darvas 
& Pisani-Ferry, 2011) which became obvious when austerity measures did not 
overcome the credit crunch or lower the risk adversity of economic agents. 
Declining lending volumes of banks have had a negative effect on the real 
economy (Acharya, et al., 2014). Despite the intensity of austerity measures 
increasing in accordance with interest spreads, confidence was not restored. (De 
Grauwe & Ji, 2013a; 2013b). These pro-cyclical adjustment policies (Truger, 
2014) can be called “The Self-Defeating Austerity Syndrome” (Independent 
Annual Growth Survey, 2012). This interpretation is sustained by the latest IMF 
data, revealing low inflation, persistently high government debt in crisis countries, 
weak investment activity, an ongoing credit crunch and little output growth for the 
EU (IMF, 2014). The negative impact of fiscal contraction was largely 
underestimated (IMF, 2012, 2014). 
Public investment seems to be the most auspicious element of fiscal policy with 
regard to growth. There is a broad consensus that investment in human capital, 
infrastructure and research and development (R&D) leading to innovation are the 
most significant determinants in attaining a sustainable long-term growth path and 
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are of the utmost importance in raising the non-price competitiveness of 
uncompetitive member countries (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1994; Darvas & Pisani-
Ferry, 2011; Seccareccia, 2012; Zachmann, 2012; Barbiero & Darvas, 2014). 
Darvas & Pisani-Ferry (2011) or Aiginger (2013) show that eastern and southern 
periphery countries have deficits in these three growth determinants. Also, 
expenditure on the determinants has been cut in these countries to meet 
budgetary rules (Barbiero & Darvas, 2014). The European Commission states: 
“Fiscal consolidation measures which began to be implemented at the end of 2010 
have resulted in significant changes in the composition of public expenditure in a 
number of Member States. In particular, growth-friendly expenditure has been cut 
back disproportionately as part of fiscal consolidation measures.” (2014e, p.140). 
Figure 1 displays how private and public investment rates both went down in the EU 
after fiscal consolidation measures were in place. 
 
 
Figure 1. Private and government gross fixed capital formation 
Source: (European Commission, 2014e, p.143) 
 
2.2. The Moment for Expansive Public Investment 
A long-lasting and controversial debate on the effect of expansive fiscal policy 
can be observed within the body of empirical literature. The discussion‟s focus is 
the size of the Keynesian multiplier. Empirical literature indicates that the 
Keynesian multipliers range between -0.2 and 5.5 percent, whereby most estimates 
range between 0.2 and 2.5 (Hemming, et al., 2002; Briotti, 2005; Fedelino & 
Hemming, 2005; Arslanalp, et al., 2010; Independent Annual Growth Survey, 
2012). A recent work by 17 economists from North-American and European 
central banks proposes a multiplier of 1.5 for public investment (Coenen et al., 
2012). The size of the multiplier is heavily dependent on, first, the economic 
circumstances under which fiscal policy is conducted and, second, which 
composition these policies feature. Multipliers are generally lower for tax changes, 
during times of economic prosperity or if they are long-term oriented. They are 
higher for expenditure changes, in times of economic slowdown and if short-term 
oriented. The economic context plays an important role. Several articles of 
Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2012a; 2012b, 2013) show that multipliers are 2.5 
percent during an economic slowdown and when the interest rate is close to zero. 
Also, the IMF recently corrected its multiplier‟s size within their models, most 
notably with regard to forecasted errors of the effects of past fiscal contraction 
measures (IMF, 2012; Blanchard & Leigh, 2013). In times of sluggish economic 
activity and especially if interest rates are close to zero, multipliers are above 
1. All in all, empirical literature supports the assumption that fiscal policy is an 
appropriate way to generate growth, because the decisive characteristics of the 
current economic circumstances indicate a multiplier larger than 1. 
Besides austerity not producing its intended results, empirical literature supports 
a significantly positive impact of expansive fiscal policy in the prevalent economic 
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environment of the EU. Public investment as the most growth-friendly expenditure 
should therefore be extended. Despite the fact that expansive fiscal measures 
would play a favourable role in a different economic policy mix, the heads of 
states and the EC do not depart from the path of austerity and alternative policies 
have to adhere to a number of restrictions. Therefore the role of austerity‟s most 
prominent proponent is important. 
2.3. Restrictions to Expansive Action and The Juncker-Plan 
Germany‟s economic philosophy is influenced by the concept of 
Ordoliberalism, entailing a laissez-faire market styled economy with a focus on 
currency policy (Bibow, 2013b). The statement “At it‟s most simplistic, the 
Bundesbank mantra holds that (price) stability causes growth.” (Bibow, 2013b, 
p.14) expresses Germany‟s preferences. Political science analyses call this model  
„conservative-corporatist‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1990), while economy-focused 
studies often use the term „(neo-) mercantilist‟ (Hein, 2012; Lucarelli, 2012; 
Bibow, 2013a). It aims at “macroeconomic stability, inclusive social policy and a 
sustained growth of industrial production” (Bonatti & Fracasso, 2013, p.1028). 
Common grounds are an export-led growth model underpinned by price stability, 
the upholding the manufacturing foundation in consent with a socially protected 
core workforce, an approach of competitiveness advantages possible through wage 
disinflation, sound public finance and flexibility on the firm level (Bonatti & 
Fracasso, 2013), while domestic demand is of minor importance (Bibow, 2012). 
The German model is highly compatible with the NCM-styled EMU framework 
and its reliance on price stability and supply-sided determination of economic 
activity. A reversal of its historic ideology and a deterioration of its 
competitiveness through wage increases, fiscal expansion and higher inflation seem 
unlikely, most of all if this would be perceived to jeopardise its export capacity and 
position in the global economy. (Bibow, 2012; Bonatti & Fracasso, 2013). To 
uphold international competitiveness after its reunification and failure to meet SGP 
rules in the early 2000s, Germany undertook painful domestic supply-sided 
reforms. German authorities refer to its past adjustments when justifying and 
promoting a German-styled reform process for deficit countries, insisting that 
supply-sided reforms, underpinned by sound public finance to restore confidence 
of financial markets, are the most promising way of recovery (Weidmann, 2012; 
Schäuble, 2013). 
Moravcsik (2012) shows that recent EMU policies are largely driven by 
German perceptions, which is grounded in the core country‟s bargaining position 
and higher relative power which was amplified by the dynamic of the crisis. As the 
greatest creditor for deficit countries, Germany has to ensure re-payment of debt 
and secure its guarantees, thereby ruling out the danger of moral hazard arising 
from the common belief that a Euro-breakup is not an option. Hence, tight 
budgetary rules for debtor countries provide security grounded on the rational 
deliberation of Germany. Scharpf (2014, p.11) supports this claim: “[…] the 
present euro- rescuing regime is institutionally entrenched as an extremely 
asymmetric intergovernmental negotiation system in which debtor governments 
have practically no bargaining power.” Additionally, Germany profits from its 
safe-haven status, making very low domestic interest rates possible (Bibow, 2012). 
The complex picture of crisis management and reforms for prevention the breakup 
of the eurozone reflects Germany‟s reluctance toward financial transfer 
mechanisms, communalisation of public debt (Bonatti & Fracasso, 2013) or any 
major advances in fiscal integration (Boyer, 2013). Besides national responsibility 
for fiscal issues being a prominent ordoliberal principle (Featherstone, 2012), 
German public opinion opposes increased financial accountability and relaxation 
in terms of adjustment efforts of debtor countries by referring to their own 
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domestic reform process. This renders relaxed rules and deepened fiscal integration 
even more unlikely (Bonatti & Fracasso, 2013; Glencross, 2013). Hence, an 
investment initiative cannot be based on the relaxation of fiscal rules, higher 
inflation levels, wage increases in creditor countries or enhanced fiscal integration. 
Therefore, calls for a fundamentally different economic policy mix (Hein, Truger 
& van Treeck, 2011; Hein & Truger, 2013) or deepened fiscal integration in the 
form of new institutions taking up new -, or communalising existing debt (Dullien 
& Schwarzer, 2011; Bibow, 2013b; De Grauwe, 2013a; Pisani-Ferry, Vihriälä & 
Wolff, 2013) are reasonable, but, by now, rather improbable. 
In November 2014 the Juncker-Plan (European Commission, 2014b; 2015) 
was presented as an initiative to give a growth impetus. According to the plan, a 
European-level fund is able to make 315 billion Euro of public and private money 
available in three years. The funds can be used for investment in strategically 
important areas, like R&D, education, competitiveness of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure. Simultaneously, the restrictive fiscal rules of 
the EMU shall be respected. A 16 billion Euro guarantee under the EU budget will 
be complemented by 5 billion Euro of EIB capital, forming a 21 billion Euro 
guarantee scheme. This scheme will back the newly set-up European Fund for 
Strategic Investment (EFSI) which operates at project-level. The fund is 
administered by the EIB and its purpose is the leverage of additional money. First, 
the EIB, by using the typical instruments, raises funds on capital markets as 
subordinated debt. Second, private investors, (public) lending institutions or 
member states are invited to participate (senior debt). The plan is rather unspecified 
at this point and offers no concrete advantages and possible consequences of this 
process (Horn et al., 2015). 
Overall, the plan expects that the initial contribution can be multiplied by a 
factor of 15. See figure 2 for visualisation of functioning. The EFSI offers risk-
finance and long-term investment support with a focus on SMEs. “The main idea is 
to provide greater risk-bearing capacity through public money in order to 
encourage project promoters and attract private finance to viable investment 
projects which would not have happened otherwise.” (European Commission, 
2014b, p.6). A further component to reduce the barriers for investment is an 
attempt to channel the raised funds to the real economy by creating a task force 
which identifies viable projects (“project pipeline”) and by offering technical 
assistance (investment advisory hub). Additionally, the plan aims at improving the 
European regulatory environment, creating a Capital Markets Union which fosters 
long-term finance and, unsurprisingly, strengthening the Single Market. At the 
national level, the Juncker-Plan invites the member states to increase to use of SFIs 
within cohesion policy. 
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Figure 2. The Juncker-Plan 
Source: Author 
 
The discussion on the Juncker-Plan is not very extended and the plan is 
perceived rather with scepticism. Claeys et al. (2014) raise doubts on adequate 
selection of attractive projects by the authorities and Veugelers (2014) highlights 
the fact that shifting budget resources could create opportunity costs if other 
programmes in turn lack funds. Despite some short statements questioning the 
multiplier‟s size (Rabesandratana, 2014; Horn et al., 2015), insufficient attention is 
paid to experience with SFIs the Juncker-Plan refers to and builds on. Hence, 
starting from the question if it is appropriate at all to rely on EU-level instruments, 
the reasonability of the suggested mechanism and proposed numbers of resource 
volumes will be assessed by an extended analysis of the SFI-use, allowing for an 
appraisal of the Juncker-Plan. As both, SFIs and the ESFI, are EU-level investment 
tools, it is useful to examine, if EU-level investment is an appropriate way to 
support recovery and induce growth. 
 
3. The EU Investment Architecture 
As national fiscal leeway is restricted, the European fiscal capacity is the 
instrument left to act. The budget is organised as a seven-year Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF). The current framework lasts from 2014 until 2020 and 
its volume amounts to 1082,56 billion Euro (Council of the EU, 2013; EC, 2013a). 
The MFF is organised in six spending categories („headings‟) of which heading 1 
(„Smart and inclusive growth‟, with subheadings 1a „Competitiveness for growth 
and jobs„ and 1b „Economic, social and territorial cohesion‟), is the one concerned 
for public investment  (total volume roughly 508,921 billion Euro). See Appendix 
1 for programmes and concrete numbers. 
Subheading 1a can be labelled „direct budget support‟ or „centrally managed‟. 
It amounts to 142,130 billion Euro or 13.1 per cent of the whole budget. 
Programmes are under control of the EC and explicitly approach human capital, 
infrastructure and R&D/innovation by offering financial support to business. 
Subheading 1b is widely known as „cohesion policy‟. It is conducted via the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds which are under „shared management‟. They aim at 
“reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions” 
(EU, 2012a, Art. 174). Cohesion policy is perceived “to contribute – through 
investments into structural change – to reducing socio-economic differences” 
(Nyikos, 2013, p.164). As regional redistribution, channelled through growth-
enhancing public investment,  is the purpose of cohesion policy, assessments of 
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the EU‟s fiscal capacity primarily refer to this policy. Resources from the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds are managed by a national Managing Authority 
(MA). The MA selects national projects or portfolios and merges these into an 
Operational Programme (OP) which will be evaluated by the EC. The EC 
ultimately decides on the grants provided to the MAs and constantly monitors the 
process of spending. Eligibility for specific funds and subsequently allocated 
volumes depend on the member states‟ size and level of development (EC, 2014a). 
Project costs are never totally covered by EU grants, but have to be completed by 
national resources because “Support (…) shall not replace public or equivalent 
structural expenditure by a Member State.” (EU, 2013c, Art. 96). This is the 
principle of additionality. 
Similar to the discussion of fiscal policy, theoretical and empirical literature on 
the impact of cohesion policy is inconclusive (Allard, Choueiri, Schadler & Van 
Elkan, 2008; Marzinotto, 2012; Haisch, Müller, Primhak & Schneider-Sliwa, 2013; 
Nyikos, 2013). Regression-based econometric studies are rather ambiguous, while 
macro-model simulations show modest (Quest model) to substantial (Hermin 
model) positive impacts. Varga and in „t Veld (2010) review different models and 
elaborate a novel micro-founded general equilibrium model, based on the EC‟s 
Quest III model. They apply it to member states receiving most of cohesion 
spending. 
Foremost, spending on infrastructure in the short-run as well as R&D and 
human capital in the medium and long run respectively, attain positive output 
effects. An example is given for Greece in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cohesion spending and output effect in Greece 
Source: Varga & in „t Veld (2010, p.43) 
 
Financial appropriations generate growth on an equal scale. Cohesion policy‟s 
meaning for public investment also underlines its importance for growth creation. 
For example, figure 4 expresses the difference of public investment with and 
without cohesion spending and underlines the importance of EU budget expenditure 
in times of economic downturn. Healy & Bristow (2014) show that the economic 
and financial crisis reduced national resources available for co-financing Structural 
and Cohesion Fund-supported projects. The pressure on national budgets led to a 
temporary relaxation of the additionality-principle, so that 95 per cent of co- 
financing was allowed for member states under financial assistance. This came 
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along with prolonged availability of OP funds from the MFF 2000-2006, 
relaxation of rules of automatic de-commitment of appropriations after a certain 
period of non-spending as well as antedated payments for large projects to counter 
the impact of the crisis (Smail, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 4. Public investment with and without cohesion spending 
Source: (European Commission, 2014e, p.155) 
 
Cohesion policy hence features flexibility to counter unanticipated 
developments and can play a vital role for economic recovery because it acts as an 
incentive to national authorities to uphold public investment (Alegre, 2010; 
Marzinotto, 2011a). Besides the impact on GDP, there are non-financial effects of 
cohesion policy amplifying the use of funds. An extensive study of ÖIR-
Management Dienste (2007) gives evidence that cohesion policy positively affects 
strategic policy, institutional capacity building and societal cohesion building of 
Europe. This is sustained by econometric analysis (Rodríguez-Pose & Novak, 
2013). Despite learning effects, weak administrative capacity and governance 
deficits curtail the effectiveness of cohesion policy. Low absorption and delays 
in spending are seen as the outcome of governance deficits and the main 
impediment to a more effective impact of cohesion policy (Marzinotto, 2011a; 
Haisch et al., 2013). 
Another institution of concern for public investment activities is the EIB. It is 
the biggest multilateral lending institution in the world (Clifton, et al., 2013). The 
bank‟s owners are the 28 member countries. It holds subscribed capital of 243,284 
billion Euro. The bank so far recorded surpluses and built up own funds of 58 
billion Euro (EIB, 2013b). The EIB is autonomous, non-profit oriented and 
finances its activities on capital markets. In 2013, lending operations amounted to 
64,019 billion Euro within the EU, and to nearly 300 billion Euro from 2009 to 
2013 (European Investment Bank, 2013d). The EIB does not service its shareholder 
in the form of dividends and holds a triple-AAA credit ranking. Thus it borrows 
and lends at low cost, mostly long-term orientated, and by treaty provisions, its 
activities have to be in line with EU objectives (European Union, 2012a; European 
Investment Bank, 2013e). The EIB‟s main fields of action are financial assistance 
in less developed regions (European Investment Bank, 2013d) with respect to 
financing of SMEs, innovation projects, climate change action and infrastructure 
(Clifton, Fuentes & Revuelta, 2013), but also human capital (Tuijnman, 2009). The 
bank finances up to 50 per cent of total project costs which means that third parties, 
private or public, have to fill the remaining gap, similar to the additionality principle 
of cohesion policy. 
Robinson‟s (2009) analysis shows EIB loans lever a great amount of additional 
resources to cover project costs, which often stem from public or private 
institutions. This is possible due to the bank‟s excellent credit ranking. Total 
volumes which are inflated through leverage of private funds are “far in excess of 
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the total budget of the EU” (2009, p.655). See Appendix II for concrete numbers. 
EIB activity gives incentive to national budget decisions and, by low interest rates 
and long-term orientation, enables projects which wouldn‟t be undertaken 
otherwise. By its size and lending practice the EIB takes on a quasi-fiscal role 
(Honohan, 1995). Above all, this supranational lending body plays an important 
role in mitigating informational deficits in credit markets, thus overcoming the 
credit crunch (Fedele, et. al., 2010). Comparable to cohesion policy, EIB activity 
has “important implications for the development of regional governance, building 
partnerships (…) and enhancing lessons drawing.” (Robinson, 2009, p.666). 
 
4. Combining Different Funding Components: Synergetic 
Financial Instruments 
A small part of the EU budget is deployed for the use of SFIs. Most of these 
became operational in 2007, but have been used in previous MFF in minor ways. 
They attracted more attention as public budgets were obliged to do more with 
fewer resources. Officially, the EU defines SFIs as the following: “"financial 
instruments" means Union measures of financial support provided on a 
complementary basis from the budget in order to address one or more specific policy 
objectives of the Union. Such instruments may take the form of equity or quasi-
equity investments, loans or guarantees, or other risk-sharing instruments, and may, 
where appropriate, be combined with grants.” (European Union, 2012b, Art. 2). 
They combine prominent features of both, EU-budget support and EIB financial 
products. The outstanding feature of budget support is its capability to support, 
uphold and enhance public investment, and in turn growth. The exceptional feature 
of EIB activity is its ability to lever great amounts of resources from public and 
private bodies. Both elicit supplementary non-financial effects. Several extensive 
reports address SFIs and provide aggregated data. The following analysis draws on 
Núnez Ferrer et al. (2012), Robinson & Bain (2012), Spence et al. (2012), EIB 
(2013a), Núnez Ferrer & Katarivas (2014) and on a report of the EC (2014f) which 
all refer to SFIs in force during the MFF 2007-2013. 
SFIs are funding instruments which conflate EU budget contributions with the 
characteristics of a financial product and offer financial assistance different from 
simple grant-giving. Grants can also be blended with financial instruments/SFIs 
established by associated financial institutions, for example the EIB (EU, 2012b). 
24 SFIs were established during the past MFF, of which 13 were EU-internal 
instruments and 11 for activity outside of the EU. Despite they are interrelated and 
reinforce one another, they can be clustered according to the EU budget‟s division, 
central management (subheading 1a or direct budget support) and shared 
management (subheading 1b or cohesion policy). 9 centrally managed SFIs are EC 
controlled EU level funds, while SFIs under shared management can be divided into 
two groups: 4 promoting and assisting instruments, enhancing the use of small scale 
SFIs at the level of nationally controlled OPs. 
Concrete management and implementation is delegated to an entrusted entity 
which is the financial intermediary the financial product stems from. Hence the 
EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF) in most cases execute this task. But 
funds can be also provided to an ordinary commercial bank which is then obligated 
to channel the money to thematically agreed projects in line with the budget 
programmes‟ legislature. Figure 5 expresses the construction and mechanisms of 
SFIs in general, but the figure is also applicable to centrally managed SFIs. EU 
budget resources become financial products of various shapes and are directed via 
holding funds, financial intermediaries or directly to the beneficiary. Table 1 lists 
all SFIs under central management and exhibits their related field of investment 
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activity as well as the volume of funds which initially haven been allocated. 
Because implementation is delegated to EIB-bodies or other financial 
intermediaries to guarantee proper execution, SFIs contain monitoring and 
reporting obligations audited by the EC and the European Court of Audits. 
Furthermore, SFIs are similar but not equal to classic Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) on project level. SFIs can offer assistance to PPPs by providing a funding 
instrument above the project level where public and private funds are pooled. Only 
the provision of funds can be described as a „partnership‟ but dispersion of 
resources to the beneficiary level is uncoupled of the claims of private investors 
and subject to European objectives. The third party participator is not integrated in 
“designing, building and operating (…) projects” (De Clerck, et al., 2012), like it is 
commonplace in ordinary PPPs. 
 
 
Figure 5. The functionig of SFIs 
Source: Núnez Ferrer & Katarivas (2014, p.9) 
 
Figure 6 explains the functioning of SFIs under shared management. Four 
instruments under shared management are technical assistance or promotion 
instruments called JESSICA, JEREMIE, JASPERS and JESSICA (JJJJs). They 
promote and assist small scale, project based SFIs at the level of OPs. These SFIs 
receive funding from the Structural and Cohesion Funds and from national 
resources. Funds are under the control of the national Managing Authority which 
performs the OP and allocates the funds towards SFIs. The financial instruments 
are set up by a financial intermediary and related to a specific project, unlike SFIs 
under central management. By the end of 2013, 941 specific SFIs within 
OPs had been established (EU, 2013c). Most of these financial products are 
concerned with SME-support. 
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Table 1. Single SFIs under central management (Mio Euro) 
SFI Field of action Type of instrument Budget contribution 
High Growth & 
Innovative SME Facility 
(GIF) SMEs (particularly 
innovative & R&D- 
related) 
Equity investment / 
Venture 
capital 
623 
SME Guarantee Facility 
(SMEG) 
Guarantee platform (for 
loans, equity, 
mezzanine, 
securitisation) 
506 
Risk Sharing Finance 
Facility (RSFF) 
R&D Risk-sharing 1000 
Loan Guarantee 
Instruments for Trans-
European Transport 
Network Projects 
(LGTT) 
Infrastructure Risk-sharing 500 
Marguerite Fund 
Infrastructure, Energy 
& Climate 
Equity 80 
European Progress 
Microfinance Facility 
(EPMF) 
Micro-credit Guarantee, Equity 100 
Technology Transfer 
Pilot Project (TTP) 
R&D Equity 2 
European Local Energy 
Assistance (ELENA) 
Urban energy 
efficiency 
Technical assistance
 
97 
European Energy 
Efficiency Fund 
(EEEF) 
Energy efficiency
 
Equity / Technical 
assistance 
146,3 
Source: Núnez Ferrer et al. (2012), Spence et al. (2012), Núnez Ferrer & Katarivas (2014) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. SFIs under shared management 
Note: Graphic amended by author; Source: EC (2014f, p.13) 
 
Table 2. Single SFIs under shared management  
SFIs (share management Field of action 
Type of 
instrument 
Budget 
contribution 
Joint Action to Support Micro-finance 
Institutions in Europe (JASMINE) 
Non-bank Micro-credit set-
up 
Technical 
assistance 
5 
Joint Assistance  to Support Projects 
in European Regions (JASPERS) 
Large-scale intrastructure 
projects 
Technical 
assistance 
35 
Joint European Support for Sustainable 
Investment in City Areas (JESSICA) 
Promotion of SFI set up & 
use (for urban development 
Equity, loan, 
guarantees 
63 
Joint European Resources for Micro to 
medium Enterprises (JEREMIE) 
Promotion of SFI use (for 
SME support) 
Equity, loan, 
guarantees 
700 
941 SFIs within OPs SME support 
Equity, loan, 
guarantees 
etc. 
9 597,62 
Source: (Núnez Ferrer and Katarivas, 2014; European Commission, 2014f) 
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4.1. Economic Rationale 
SFIs target structurally important areas of public investment and “could provide 
an important new financing stream for strategic investments, supporting long-
term, sustainable investment at a time of fiscal constraint.” (EC, 2011, p.3). They 
should address  “market failures or sub-optimal investment situations, which have 
proven to be financially viable but do not give rise to sufficient funding from 
market sources.” (EU, 2012b, Art. 140). SFIs shall increase the reach of the EU‟s 
fiscal policy in times of austerity and overcome symptoms of the crisis-induced 
credit crunch respectively approach the risk-aversion of economic actors by risk- 
bearing. SFIs go beyond ordinary grant allocation. EU budgetary resources are 
pooled with a financial product, open to the participation of other public or private 
investors. The involvement of a public institution (grant element) mitigates risk for 
investors and reduces the costs of setting up the instrument (Núnez Ferrer et al., 
2012). Hence, the concrete project benefits from lower risk and faces lower costs 
of funding, especially important if the project “either does not generate sufficient 
revenue to cover the interests of a loan, or because the risks are too high according 
to the assessment of private investors.” (Núnez Ferrer & Katarivas, 2014, p.8). 
The loan element of SFIs assures financial discipline and encourages the 
productivity of a project. The instruments are designed to address market 
imperfections, if a project is risky or not bankable for private investors in times of 
mistrust, as well as encouraging the pooling of funds, hence making large-scale 
projects which wouldn‟t been undertaken by a single financial institution more 
viable. The risk-sharing character of SFIs increases their attractiveness and 
ultimately levers a multiple amount of the initial budget contribution from third 
parties. The leverage of a SFI is measured in a threefold way: 
1. The initial EU budget contribution levers resources from SFI-associated 
institutions, like the EIB. This is the instrument leverage (IL). IL ratio = funds 
triggered by instrument from associated institutions / initial budget contribution. 
2.   The instrument further attracts funds from third parties (other public or private 
financial institutions or investors) which is the project leverage (PL). PL ratio = 
total funds / IL. 
3.   The comparison of total funding to the initial budget contribution is called the 
multiplier effect (ME). ME = total funds / initial budget contribution or IL ratio x PL 
ratio (Spence, et al., 2012). 
The PL is the measure for the attractiveness of the instrument and builds upon 
the IL. The ME expresses the EU budget contribution‟s reach if pooled with an 
SFI, but it is “just one element of the overall measure of the impact of any given 
investment.” (Núnez Ferrer et al., 2012, p.26). The actual investment volume at the 
beneficiary level can be different to the leverage ratio, as many SFIs are still 
running and actual investment also depends on demand or existence of appropriate 
projects. It represents the temporary status quo of SFIs‟ impact. SFIs generate 
revenues, receptive to re-use, which establish a revolving and thus sustainable 
character. The instruments are subject to different governance principles and are 
consistently monitored (EU, 2012b, Art.140). They should not substitute for 
national expenditure, so projects always have to be co-financed. SFIs must be in line 
with European objectives (European value added) which is difficult to define, but 
enhancing growth by public investment in structurally important areas according to 
empirical evidence can be considered sufficient. Besides, extensive risk-evaluation 
is unalterable to minimise risk exposure to the EU-budget contribution, whereas 
Spence et al. (2012) discern that SFIs do not imply more risk than simple grants. 
4.2. Impact Assessment 
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Taking all SFIs (also externals) together, approximately 1.3 per cent of the 
MFF 2007-2013 resources were allocated to SFIs (Núnez Ferrer et al., 2012). The 
total volumes of SFIs under central management are listed in Table 2. An initial 
budget contribution of 3,064 billion Euro triggered available funds of 55,025 
billion Euro of which actual investments at the beneficiary level amount to 30,923 
billion Euro. This means an average ME of 18. It‟s difficult to generalise IL and PL 
due to inconsistent data in the available reports. In contrast to the final volumes of 
SFIs, the EIB-group contributions couldn‟t be reconstructed completely, but final 
numbers suggest that IL- and PL-ratios are actually higher than in Table 3, which 
features all SFI- programmes and its volumes. This is also the reason why equation 
IL x PL = ME is not correct on the aggregate level. Single instruments are of better 
explanatory power.  R&D investment by SFIs is a good example for the potential 
of centrally managed SFIs. The Risk Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF) is targeted 
at risky innovation-projects and innovative SMEs and, in case of default, bears 
potential losses of investments. The RSFF levered great amounts of additional 
resources. Its multiplier is 16, which can be expressed as 1 billion EU budget 
resources attracted a further 1 billion Euro by the EIB and in 2010 total available 
funds reached 16,2 billion Euro (ME = 16.2) of which 4,8 billion Euro haven been 
disbursed to this point of time. Núnez Ferrer & Katarivas (2014) show that 
leverage effects tackle an important deficient of European R&D investment. 
Public government expenditure on R&D is comparable to innovation-leaders like 
Japan and the United States, but private risk-capital is lacking and innovations face 
difficulties to become profitable in sizable productions. The RSFF fills this gap by 
attracting and channelling private risk capital. Covering and spreading risk makes 
projects more bankable and “The RSFF has started at a moment where investment 
in R&D has been affected by the crisis, providing a welcome financial injection in 
an area of highest priority for the EU.” (Núnez Ferrer & Katarivas, 2014, p.12). 
The case of SFIs under shared management, particularly specific SFIs within 
OPs, is different and leverage of additional funds only reached low numbers. The 
summary report of the EC and an EIB-study (European Investment Bank, 2013a; 
European Commission, 2014f) show that 14,278 billion Euro of OP contributions 
were provided. 12,648 billion Euro became operational in 941 SFIs. Out of these, 
7,929 billion Euro stem from the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and 
4,217 billion Euro falls under additionality. Private participation occurs within 
national co-financing and, separately measured, by outside-OP contributions. But 
as only 45 SFIs received outside-OP funds, the aggregate leverage ratios of table 
4 as a measurement of the instruments‟ mechanism are distorted. 
 
Table 3. SFIs programme volumes (central management) 
SFI (central 
management) 
Budget 
contribution 
EIB-Group 
contrubition 
Total Leverange Actual 
Investment 
GIF 623 n.a. 2300 (ME=3,6) 1900 
SMEG 506 n.a. 14200 (ME=28 9400 
RSFF 1000 1000 (IL= 1) 16200 (PL=16,2; ME=16,2) 4800 
LGTT 500 500 (IL=1) 20000 (PL= 40; ME= 40) 12000 
Marguerite Fund 80 1000 (IL=1,25) 1500 (PL= 15; ME= 18,75) 780 
EPMF 100 100 (IL=1) 225 (PL= 2,25; ME= 2,25) 178 
TTP 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
ELENA 97 n.a. Ratio > 20 (expected) 1600 
EEEF 146,3 75 (IL=0,51) 600 (PL= 8; ME= 4,1) 265 
Total 3064,3 1775 55025 30923 
Ø Leverange ratio  Ø IL= 0,92 ØPL= 16,3; ØME= 18  
Source: Núnez Ferrer et al. (2012), Spence et al. (2012), Núnez Ferrer & Katarivas (2014) 
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Table 4. SFIs programme volumes (shared management) 
SFI (central 
management) 
Budget contribution 
EIB-Group 
contrubition 
Total Leverange Actual Investment 
941 SFIs 
7929,49 (initially 
allocated: 9597,62 
4217304 432,39 6678,2 
Total   12578,92  
Ø Leverange ratio  IL= 0,53 PL= 2,99 ME= 1,6  
Source: (European Commission, 2014f) 
 
To get a more precise picture, one can look at the data given for these 45 SFIs. A 
335,77 million Euro budget contribution was matched by 309,55 million Euro of 
national co-financing and levered 423,39 million Euro private capital. See figure 5 
for details. This calculation will be helpful for an assessment of the future impact 
of SFIs under shared management. It is obvious that a crucial deficit of SFIs within 
OPs is the inability to lever private funds. This point will be taken up in the next 
sections. What can be stated is that the initial EU budget contribution of 7,929 
billion Euro made 12,578 billion Euro available and triggered investments of 
6,678 billion Euro at the beneficiary level as at the end of 2013. 
 
Table 5. SFIs within OPs exhibiting private participation 
SFIs (within Ops wich 
received external fund) 
Budget contribution National co-financing 
contribution 
Total Leverange 
42 SFIs 335,77 309,55 432,39 
Total   1068,71 
Ø Leverange ratio  IL= 0,92 PL= 3,45; ME= 3,16 
Source: (European Commission, 2014f) 
 
Measured against the EU-28 GDP in 2013 (EuroStat, 2014a), resources available 
for investment amount to about 67,603 billion Euro or 0.52 per cent of GDP and 
actual investment to 0,28 per cent of GDP. Given the small amount of deployed 
budget resources (0,09 per cent of GDP), the impact is significant. The findings of 
section 2.2 suggest that public investment in recessionary times causes a multiplier 
of above 1. Applying Coenen et al. (2012) who propose a multiplier of 1.5, the 
available investment volume of 67,603 billion Euro or 0.52 per cent of EU-28 GDP 
ultimately could raise this by 0.78 per cent. Overall, SFIs successfully address 
market failures and lever great amounts of additional resources from third parties. 
The public risk-bearing capacity and various financial products with public 
participation attract a multiple of the deployed resources. Investment is ensured to 
align with European objectives and target structurally important areas, so that SFIs 
are also able to guarantee long-term capital inflows for less developed member 
states by their revolving character, enhance non-price competitiveness as well as 
serve the implications of empirical analysis of section 2.2. SFIs do not interfere 
with the predominant paradigm of austerity as they do not increase public debt and 
therefore provide a possibility to circumvent the currently restrictive nature of the 
EMU. 
 
Table 6. Aggregated data and multipliers 
SFIs (aggregate) Central management Shared management (+JJJJs) 
Budget contribution 3064,3 7929349 (+803) = 8732,49 
Aviable funds 55025 12578,92 
Ø ME 18 1,4 
Total 67603,92  
Source: author‟s calculation based on cited reports (p.21) 
 
4.3. Estimate of Future Volume 
Volumes of funds allocated to SFIs are perceived to increase according to 
regulations of the most important subheading 1a-programmes for the MFF 2014-
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2020. The Horizon 2020 regulation (EU, 2013b) for R&D and SME support 
establishes otherwise unspecified equity and debt instruments (successors of the 
RSFF) and allocated funds will be almost tripled. Infrastructure investment will be 
organised under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) (EU, 2013d) and not 
further specified equity and debt instruments (successors of the LGTT and the 
Marguerite Fund) can get up to 10 per cent of the CEF‟s resources. Support for 
innovative SMEs will be organised under the COSME programme (EU, 2013a) 
and comprise the Loan Guarantee Facility (LGF) and the Equity Facility for 
Growth (EFG) (successors of SMEG and GIF) which should closely interact with 
Horizon 2020. 60 per cent of the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs 
(COSME) programme funds could be allocated towards the two SFIs. Appendix 3 
provides conceivable amounts of subheading 1a-SFIs for the MFF 2014-2020. 
With regard to cohesion policy (subheading 1b), SFIs are perceived to expand, 
too (EU, 2013c). Future allocations are impossible to assess, because it‟s upon the 
MA how many SFIs for which eligible projects will be set up and the process is 
highly demand-driven. Taking into account the deficiencies of the past MFF 
period, a further increase in numbers and leverage, as well as decreases in delays 
and unused funds can be expected.  However, the most recent evaluation exhibits 
that funding and absorption continuously accelerated (European Commission, 
2014f). Increased experience should lead to enhanced absorption of committed 
funds, whereas national co-financing is constant due to fiscal constraints. 
Additionally, it is conceivable that the SFIs‟ central mechanism, the leverage of 
private funds, becomes effective throughout all instruments due to learning effects. 
The assumption of general dispersion of leverage is reasonable against the 
backdrop of sustained risk aversion of investors and increased experience with SFIs 
within OPs. With the given information on allocations, the impact of SFIs during 
the next MFF can be assessed. For this, all funds for SFI-use out of authorised 
programmes originating in subheading 1a of the upcoming MFF (Appendix 3) will 
be the first component. The ratio of IL, PL and the ME from the old instruments 
(section 4.2) are projected on the new ones. Their values stay equal, as the inherent 
logic of SFIs remains the same. With regard to subheading 1b allocations, it is not 
possible to foresee how many funds will be allocated to SFIs within OPs over the 
next six years. Hence reliance on past experience seems the best option, so starting 
with numbers from table 4 and the number of initially allocated, but not fully 
absorbed funds (9597,62). The PL of the 45 SFIs which levered private funds 
(table 5) will be applied to all instruments to gauge the assumed dispersion of the 
leverage effect (PL*). By this, a ME of 1,66 emerges. Table 7 demonstrates the 
potential volumes of resources which are yet decided on, moreover amended by 
volumes building on numbers of the past MFF, adjusted by assumptions of higher 
absorption and leverage. 
 
Table 7. Aggregated data of future volumes of SFIs 
 Central management Shared management 
Budget contribution 7545,6 9597,62 
Associated institutions / National co-fin. ≈ 7168,32 4680,58 
Leverage ratios IL ≈ 0,95; PL ≈ 16,3 IL= 0,48; PL*= 3,45 
ME 18 1,66 
Total available funds 135820,8 15932,1 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on Appendix 3 and section 4.2 
 
It‟s obvious that decided allocations of subheading 1a instruments considerably 
raise the impact of investment activity by SFIs in comparison to the past MFF by a 
tripling of the initial budget contribution and a constant leverage ratio. Regarding 
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subheading 1b instruments, the impact is bigger due to the dispersion of the PL to all 
SFIs. Taken together, future available funds would amount to 151,752 billion Euro. 
Calculations of SFIs under central management consider allocations which are 
already known, but it is possible that more SFIs will be set up and those in testing 
(Project Bonds) become fully implemented. The success so far could raise 
attractivity, too, which is also not included here. Hence, the given volume depicts a 
minimum. Notwithstanding higher absorption and extension of the ME to all SFIs 
under shared management, the volumes above are also cautious calculations as the 
instruments seem attractive alternatives in times of suppressed fiscal capacity and 
shifts in a period of 6 years are possible, especially with regard to the fact, that left 
over resources from Structural and Cohesion Funds could be another source of 
funding. 
 
5. Comparison and Critical Assessment 
Experience shows that the functioning and the concrete numbers of the Juncker-
Plan, the leverage of private funds by a factor of 15, are feasible in principle. The 
logic of the crucial mechanism, to offer public risk-bearing for attracting private 
funds, is sustained by the analysis of SFIs and hence a reasonable way to look for 
new sources of funding investments. The EFSI‟s targeting of investment fields and 
the provided financial products   (European Commission, 2015) are congruent to 
the above presented analysis of SFIs-use. In terms of IL and PL, SFI analysis and 
the Juncker-Plan show differences in calculation. The ESIF as a whole is treated as 
the initial budget contribution. This includes the EIB participation of 5 billion Euro 
which is not treated as IL here. Ongoing from that, leverage is divided in the fund-
raising activity of the EIB on capital markets as the IL (ratio = 3). This means the 
EIB is enabled for operations of 63 billion Euro, backed by the ESIF. In the second 
step the participation of private or other investing institutions appears as the PL 
(ration = 5). The plan remains vague on the concrete financial operations or about 
what is expected from this twofold strategy of fund raising. However, if the EIB 
participation for the creation of the 21 billion Euro budget guarantee scheme which 
backs the ESIF is counted as an initial budget contribution, the calculation reveals 
that the Juncker-Plan puts more weight on the shoulders of the EIB through the 
high IL (63 billion Euro taken up by ordinary EIB operations) and comparably low 
PL (PL ratio of 5). Criticism on the imprecise explanation of this part of the 
Juncker-Plan are comprehensible (Horn et al., 2015). But as the success of both 
steps of fund raising are dependent on the attractiveness of the public risk 
bearing capacity, the logic of the ESIF is comparable to SFIs. 
By this, a multiplier of 15 is not unreasonable, but fits the past performance of 
SFIs under central management and exploits the synergies existing between EU 
budget support as well as EIB credit worthiness and implementation expertise. The 
implied centralisation of the plan through control of the EC seems appropriate, 
given the disappointing performance of SFIs under shared management. Foremost 
if SFI are executed and promoted by national authorities in countries with a weak 
administrative capacity. 
Nevertheless, the instruments‟ attractiveness must be maintained for constant 
success. As this depends on risk aversion of investors who utilise risk-sharing with 
a public institution, SFIs attractiveness could diminish coincidently with risk 
aversion also declining during economic recovery (Cohn, et al., 2014). But as long 
as the economic outlook for the EU and particularly periphery countries is 
sobering, crisis induced capital flight and retrenched lending activity of 
commercial banks don‟t seem to reverse (Acharya et al., 2014). The economic 
environment is advantageous for the EFSI. The attractiveness of the EFSI depends 
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on how the risk-bearing is designed. The Juncker-Plan proposes first-loss or full 
guarantees (European Commission, 2015). Claeys et al. (2014) show that a first-
loss guarantee significantly increases incentives for investors to participate. This is 
sustained e.g. by the RSFF, which bears risk also as a first-loss piece and exhibits a 
high multiplier. The higher the projects‟ risk, the more attractive is a first- loss 
guarantee. This leads to a another issue, the question of how to, on the one hand, 
properly select projects with an attractive risk character, and, on the other hand, 
avoid default but also windfall profits, which could occur if risk is lower and private 
investors would have undertaken the projects also without risk sharing (Horn et al., 
2015). Politicised project selection is hence unfavourable (Claeys, Sapir & Wolff, 
2014). The Juncker-Plan foresees a Steering Board consisting of the EC and EIB 
members, as well as seats for all kinds of EFSI-contributors to guarantee 
productive governance. The board should decide in consensus and a veto right is 
guaranteed to the EC and EIB. 
The disappointing performance of SFIs under shared management highlights 
the SFIs‟ complexity and problems of integration of SFIs in the grant-based 
cohesion framework. The Juncker-Plan demands an enhanced use of SFIs within 
OPs, but does not include that in the calculation for the emerging investment 
volume for good reason. Further issues, also concerning SFIs under central 
management, arise from a lack of coherence and coordination between the 
instruments (Núnez Ferrer et al., 2012), questions of eligibility (European Court of 
Auditors, 2012) as well as from a trade-off between visibility and transparency 
(Robinson & Bain, 2012). All kinds of SFIs will undergo comprehensive 
restructuring and re-naming during the MFF 2014-2020. The EC proposes the 
general term „equity and debt instruments‟ for all kinds of SFIs to introduce a 
standardised set of principles and rules, which can be seen as a reaction to 
difficulties performing SFIs in the regulatory framework of various budget 
programmes which creates unnecessary complexity (EC, 2011). Also, the Juncker-
Plan recognises that the use of financial products is challenging and approaches this 
by the set-up of an investment advisory “Hub” which should offer technical 
assistance at all levels. Mutual learning and knowledge-sharing between public and 
private institutions is required to improve implementation and performance. 
Another critical point to the Juncker-Plan is the endowment with- and origin of- 
resources apart from the EIB-contribution. A 16 billion Euro EU guarantee fund 
originating in the budget should back the EFSI. 50 per cent of that guarantee would 
be provisioned as real budget resources until 2020. These funds are shifted from 
Horizon 2020, the CEF and other unspecified budget margins. If already allocated 
resources for specific programmes or projects, which also yield returns, are taken 
away, an opportunity cost emerges (Veugelers, 2014). Especially, Horizon 2020 
and the CEF are promising tools and it‟s not specified which parts will be 
abandoned in favour of the EFSI. To decrease the amount available for CEF-, or 
Horizon 2020- SFIs would be highly unreasonable (a reduction of the volumes in 
table 3 would be possible, especially funds are shifted away from SFI-use), the 
aggregate impact of EU budget support would not increase and, in the end, the plan 
could depict pure eyewash. The proposal regulation says: “Should the guarantee be 
called, the volume of guarantee would be reduced below the original EUR 16bn. 
However, future revenues due to the Union from the EFSI activities should be 
allowed to reinstate the EU guarantee up to this original amount.” (European 
Commission, 2015, p.5). Hence, the EFSI‟s target leverage could be changed over 
time as it primarily depends on the initial budget security scheme. 
Furthermore it is unclear if the proposed amount of funds can be gathered in 
three years. SFIs, like the RSFF, often need the full six years of the last MFF to 
attain the resulting multiplier. Funds were fed in on an annual basis and the 
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amounts differed from year to year (European Investment Bank, 2013c). But it is 
also possible that the great prominence of the EFSI and its high visibility could 
lead to faster leverage. 
 
6. Alternative Ways of Funding 
The question arises if there are possibilities left to financially underpin the ESIF 
as the planned endowment of the ESIF is questionable. The past negotiations on 
the EU budget showed no room for enlargement in times of austerity (Marzinotto, 
2011b). An often recalled proposal to raise funds for economic recovery is the 
introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). 
The EC (2013b) proposes the introduction of a FTT with support of 11 member 
states which recently renewed their commitment for an introduction by 2016 
(Council of the European Union, 2015). But the circle misses the most important 
European financial centre: the United Kingdom (UK) and London. Hence, the 
budget revenues generated by the tax are remarkably lower for only 11 member 
states than for the EU-28. However the budgetary revenue is estimated to between 
30 and 35 billion Euro if a tax on shares and bond of 0.1 per cent and on 
derivatives of 0.01 per cent will be introduced (EC, 2013b). The question is how 
revenues will behave if international banks relocate transactions to their 
subsidiaries located in non-FTT countries. Despite this being un-assessable, it is 
possible to simulate different legal states of subsidiaries as Schulmeister (2014) 
does. The first scenario treats subsidiaries as incorporated in UK-law and thus not 
subject to a FTT (relocation effect). The second scenario assumes all subsidiaries 
as branches of their parent companies (no relocation effect). If all subsidiaries were 
subject to UK law, revenues for the 11 FTT-introducing member states still amount 
to 28.3 billion Euro (see Appendix 6). Recent literature rules out negative effects 
on growth and even suggests a positive impact on GDP (Griffith-Jones & Persaud, 
2012). How can the newly generated funds support the Juncker-Plan? As the FTT 
probably won‟t be introduced in the EU-28, but only by 11 member states, national 
ownership of revenues comes into play. But the regulation proposal of the EC 
declares that “part of receipts generated by the FTT shall constitute an own 
resource for the EU budget.” (European Commission, 2013b). Table 8 
demonstrates that the overall share of national funds fed in SFIs is low given the 
amount of money allocated to grant giving through the structural and cohesion 
funds. As the ESIF can be expected to yield more success than SFIs under shared 
management, it should be considered to assign more national contributions to 
financial engineering instruments. FTT revenues could substitute for the EU budget 
resources the Juncker-Plan wants to shift in favour of the ESIF (which maybe 
dampens the budgets‟ overall impact) and be fed into the ESIF as national 
contributions. Besides, it is doubtful if the cohesion policy framework is adequate 
to execute the use of SFIs given the remarkable low multipliers (see table 6), it is 
therefore reasonable to direct national funds, generated by the FTT, towards a 
centrally managed funding instrument. 
Another option to further increase the reach of EU expenditure is the expansion 
of EIB‟s lending capacity (Griffith-Jones & Cozzi, forthcoming). The last rise of 
EIB‟s capital by the member states of about 10 billion Euro in 2012 
significantly increased the bank‟s lending activity (EIB, 2013b; EIB & EC, 2013). 
See figure 7 for changes of lending capacity. The EIB is able to offer 60 billion Euro 
more loans over three years (2013-2015) by a capital increase of 10 billion while 
maintaining its triple-A rating which depends on a ratio of bank‟s capital and its 
lending volumes (EIB & EC, 2013). The proposal of an further increase of EIB‟s 
capacity is supported by decisive voices in European economic decision making, 
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like Wolfgang Schäuble, the finance minister of Germany (Mussler, 2014), EIB 
president Werner Hoyer (Buergin, 2014) or EC‟s and European Parliament‟s 
heads, Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz (Traynor, 2014). Hence, the 
approach to again increase the EIB‟s capital by 10 billion Euro can be considered a 
realistic option. 
It is speculative to which operating sites these new funds will be allocated to. 
After the 2012 capital increase a Joint EIB-EC report (EIB & EC, 2013) notifies 
that “the additional lending enabled by the capital increase is supporting viable 
projects within all Member States with a particular focus on (i) Innovation and 
skills; (ii) SME access to finance; (iii) Resource efficiency; and (iv) Strategic 
infrastructure.” (EIB & EC, 2013, p.8). These will happen via the expansion of 
existing lending strategies, introduction of new initiatives, a strengthened risk 
capital mandate, amplified interaction with national public lending institutions, the 
project bond initiative and other already established risk-sharing SFIs. Overall, the 
report expresses the EIB‟s and EC‟s diversified strategy how to proceed with 
increased capacity. 
 
 
Figure 7. EIB capital increase and lending capacity 
Source: (EIB & EC, 2013, p.8) 
 
Table 8. Member States’ Contribution to SFIs 
Member State National co-financing Deviation until 2013 National funds allocated SFIs 
Germany 12200 + 2% (12444) 525,9 4,4 % 
Italy 31300 -37% (19719) 1523,3 7,73% 
Spain 15000 -29% (10650) 271,72 2,56% 
Austria 1150 +1% (1161,5) 5,27 0,4% 
France 13900 -4% (13346) 92,09 0,7% 
Estonia 450 0% (450) 75,33 
Ø 5,6% 
Greece 5700 -34& 3762) 279,78 
Belgium 2500 -12% (2200) 234,89 
Portugal 3600 -42% (2088) 110,70 
Slovakia 2000 +2% (2040) 16,73 
Slovenia 700 0% (700) 15,87 
Others   1065,46 n.a. 
Total   4217,04  
Source: (European Commission, 2014f) 
 
A report on behalf of the European Parliament investigating EIB co-financing 
practice concludes that EIB‟s “transition in terms of risk appetite has happened 
gradually, although the pace of evolution does appear to have hastened recently 
with the bank accepting more commercial risk today. However in most of its 
operations the EIB remains a very conservative lender.” (Robinson & Bain, 2012, 
p.82). Also Núnez Ferrer et al. (2012, p.26) ascribe a “excessively stringent 
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interpretation of risk that impacts on the final leverage and multiplier effect” to the 
budget component of SFIs. Núnez Ferrer et al. (2012, p.27) further state: “A more 
reasonable risk assessment – even conservative – would considerably enhance the 
leverage and multiplier effect of the instruments.” A gradual departure from 
restrained lending activity can be attested by a statement in the Joint EIB-EC report: 
“the Risk Capital Mandate was reinforced and established as an open ended” (EIB 
& EC, 2013). Hence, it seems a viable option to moderately take on more risk in 
the MFF 2014-2020 if a capital increase, again, improves the capital adequacy 
ratio of the EIB. The EIB‟s entrenched role in commercial bank-type activities, 
emerging through SFI-related investment and project based credit risk 
assessment (Robinson & Bain, 2012) hasn‟t had negative effects on its credit 
ranking,  with especially “the EIB's capital buffer providing a significant cushion. 
Following the recent capital increase, the bank's Basel II capital adequacy ratio 
amounted to 28.7 per cent as of the end-2013 (compared to 23.1per cent at the end 
of 2012), which is high relative to the 8 per cent minimum for commercial banks.” 
(Moody‟s Investors Service, 2014). Hence, the Juncker-Plan‟s intention to upgrade 
the role of the EIB also in terms of obligations to the capital markets would be 
solidly underpinned by a capital increase and the elevation must not deteriorate 
the EIB‟s paramount credit rating. Taken together, there is considerable room to 
magnify the volume of resources without increasing public debt. Both possibilities 
do not violate EMU budgetary rules or do not imply further transfer to, or 
liabilities, especially for periphery member states. Also the Juncker-Plan assures 
that the EC treats contributions to the ESIF benevolently with respect to public 
debt investigation. The EIB plays a conspicuous role in levering resources 
by enhancing creditworthiness and above all, in implementing SFIs. Therefore it is 
reasonable to expand its mandate. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The European economy is hallmarked by the ramification of the self-imposed 
fiscal constraint of national budgets and the inability of recovery from the economic 
crisis. Tight budgetary rules are likely to persist, as they fit the basic theoretical 
paradigm the EMU is built on and the perception of the most powerful negotiation 
party, Germany. But the fiscally constrained member states, foremost the periphery 
countries, need expansive economic policies to create a growth impetus. Such an 
initiative can only be placed within the current framework of fiscal coordination 
and surveillance and may not increase public debt levels. A pragmatic approach 
hence should recognise these restrictions and simultaneously achieve maximum 
impact in terms of well-targeted investment which promises to attain positive 
effects on growth in the current economic environment. 
The Juncker-Plan is an initiative for investment activity acknowledging the 
EMU budgetary rules and proposing an EU-level investment vehicle. Suppressed 
national budgets shift the focus on the EU budget. Recent literature shows that the 
EU‟s fiscal capacity is appropriate to support economic recovery. Besides positive 
growth effects, it features the required flexibility to react to economic downturns.  
Also the EIB is successful in its lending operations and offers experience in long-
term investment, leverage of additional funds and expertise in implementation of 
complex financial products. Hence, it is reasonable to rely on EU-level 
instruments. 
The Juncker-Plan‟s very own purpose is the leverage of private funds by risk-
bearing and – sharing. The volumes of funds raised for the EFSI depend on the 
multiplier effect, ergo the attractiveness of the financial product for investors and 
the potential projects. This mechanism builds on experience with SFIs. The 
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analysis of SFI-use during the last MFF allows for an examination of the Juncker-
Plan‟s central number: the multiplier of 15. SFIs under central management, which 
means under control of the EC and EIB, attain convincing results. They lever great 
amounts of private funds by conflating EU budget resources with financial products. 
Especially first-loss risk sharing instruments experience significant participation of 
private investors and confirm that the multiplier‟s size of the Juncker-Plan is 
reasonable. As the EFSI dominating parties will be the EC and the EIB, efficient 
implementation can be expected. Project selection and technical assistance are the 
main challenges facing the EC and the EIB. 
As the EFSI‟s purpose is to give security for project-investment it is 
problematic to supply the EFSI with an unspecified financial endowment. The 
guarantee scheme of the budget backing the ESFI is not properly specified, and the 
total leverage depicts rather a maximum. Failing projects and in turn potential calls 
on the guarantee scheme could diminish the volume of the guarantee. Additionally, 
the impact of the budget as a whole could be damaged if already allocated 
resources are shifted in favour of the EFSI. Especially, if SFIs, the parts of the 
budget with the highest return, will lack funds, shifting is undesirable. Hence, it is 
important to find alternative ways of increasing the solidity of the EFSI‟s financial 
backing. First, the FTT could depict a source of funding if the member states are 
willing to increase their support to progressive fiscal policy instruments. This is 
important against the background of the poor performance of SFI-use via cohesion 
policy and under managing participation of member states. Given the low leverage 
potential, it is worth to reconsider the operation of SFIs in cohesion policy at all. 
Second, the enhanced role of the EIB should be underpinned by a capital increase 
which gives the bank a solid financial foundation to execute more risky projects. 
The experience with SFIs shows that the Juncker-Plan is no cloud-castle. But 
deficiencies of endowment of the investment initiative reflect that the Juncker-Plan 
is also no solution to the basic problems induced by austerity. To rely on 
progressive fiscal instruments can activate participation of private investors in 
growth-friendly economic areas and at least help to overcome the state of weak 
investment activity in Europe. 
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Appendixes 
1. The MFF 2014-2020 
 
 
Subheading 1a Subheading 1b 
Programme Investment category Volume Programme Investment 
category 
Volume 
 
Connecting Europe 
Facility 
 
(CEF) 
Infrastructure 
(energy, 
telecomm
unication, 
transport) 
 
 
21 936,76 
 
 
Cohesion Fund (CF) 
 
 
 
Investment 
according to 
national 
Operational 
Programmes 
(OPs) 
 
 
74 928,36 
 
Copernicus 
 
Infrastructure 
 
4 291,48 
Less developed regions 
(ESF, ERDF) 
 
185 374,42 
Competitiveness of 
Enterprises 
 
and SMEs (COSME) 
Competitiveness 
and 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
2 298,24 
More developed regions 
(ESF, ERDF) 
 
55 780,14 
 
Erasmus+ 
 
Human Capital 
 
14 774,52 
Outermost and sparsely 
populated regions 
 
1 562,99 
Galileo Infrastructure 7 071,73 Territorial cooperation 10 228,81 
Horizon 2020 R&D 79 401,83 Transition regions 35 701,31 
ITER R&D 2 985,62 Youth employment 
initiative 
Education 3 211,22 
Excluded programmes: Customs, Taxation and Fight 
against Fraud (908,01), 
Employment and Social innovation Programme 
(7 057,69), Nuclear decommissioning assistance 
programmes (225,32). These programmes are 
excluded because they do not concern public 
investment categories. 
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2. EIB loans and leverage effect 
 
 
 
 
 
3. MFF 2014-2020 estimates for SFIs‟ volume (central management) (Mio Euro) 
MFF 2007-2013 
instruments 
MFF 2014-2020 instruments Allocated budget 
resources 
RSSF, GIF Horizon 2020  Two instruments 
(equity and debt) 
2 842,3 
LGTT, Marguerite CEF  Two instruments (equity and 
debt) 
3 324,3 
SMEG COSME – LGF & EFG 1 379 
Total  7545,6 
Source: European Union (2013a; b; d) 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Scenarios of FTT introduction 
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